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ABSTRACT
We consider the impact of cohort turnover—the simultaneous exit of a large number of experienced
employees and a similarly sized entry of new workers—on productivity in the context of teaching
hospitals.  In particular, we examine the impact of the annual July turnover of house staff (i.e.,
residents and fellows) in American teaching hospitals on levels of resource utilization (measured by
risk-adjusted length of hospital stay) and quality (measured by risk-adjusted mortality rates).  Using
patient-level data from roughly 700 hospitals per year over the period from 1993 to 2001, we
compare  monthly  trends  in  length  of  stay  and  mortality  for  teaching  hospitals  to  those  for
non-teaching hospitals, which, by definition, do not experience systematic turnover in July.  We find
that the annual house-staff turnover results in increased resource utilization (i.e., higher risk-adjusted
length of hospital stay) for both minor and major teaching hospitals and decreased quality (i.e.,
higher risk-adjusted mortality rates) for major teaching hospitals.  Further, these effects with respect
to mortality are not monotonically increasing in a hospital’s reliance on residents for the provision
of care.  In fact, the most-intensive teaching hospitals manage to avoid significant effects on
mortality following this turnover.  We provide a preliminary examination of the roles of supervision
and worker ability in explaining why the most-intensive teaching hospitals appear able to reduce













Nearly all managers must deal with the consequences of employee turnover 
within their organizations.  Despite the importance of this issue, several authors have 
observed that academic attention has been disproportionately focused on the causes 
rather than consequences of turnover (Staw, 1980; Mobley, 1982; Glebbeek and Bax, 
2004).  One possible explanation for the dearth of studies on the effects of turnover is the 
difficulty in answering this question empirically.  Turnover is an endogenous 
phenomenon that may occur for a wide variety of reasons that are not observed by the 
researcher.  For example, more productive workers may be more likely to remain with a 
given company longer than less productive ones (Jovanovic, 1979).  Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to make causal inferences concerning turnover' s effect on 
productivity and performance using firm-level data.   
  A second issue concerning the effect of turnover on firm performance is that 
turnover, itself, appears in multiple forms.  Many firms face a continuous stream of 
individual turnover in which employees leave and are replaced by new workers at various 
points throughout the year.  In such settings, there is no one particular time during the 
year when managers are required to train and orient a large portion of their workforces. 
In contrast, other firms bring on new employees in large numbers at discrete 
points in the year.  For example, law and consulting firms tend to start most of their new 
employees in late summer or early fall.  These new employees must all be trained and 
integrated into the firm at one time.  In the law and consulting examples, the potential 
negative effects of the large inflow of new workers may be buffered by the fact that firms 
do not face the simultaneous exist of large portions of their experience workers.  Rather, 
these departures occur in a roughly continuous manner throughout the year.    
2 
An extreme, though not uncommon, form of this discrete scenario is what we 
term cohort turnover—the simultaneous exit of a large number of experienced employees 
and a similarly sized entry of new workers—and serves as the focus of this study.  
Examples of cohort turnover can be found in changeovers that occur between military 
units in combat, political administrations,
1 and residents and fellows in teaching 
hospitals.  The use of replacement workers during large-scale labor strikes represents yet 
another case of cohort turnover.  Given the number of individuals transitioning either into 
or out of employment at a specific point in time, cohort turnover raises concerns about 
adverse effects on productivity due to factors such as operational disruption (Krueger and 
Mas, 2004) or the loss of the tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) held by departing workers. 
In this paper, we consider cohort turnover among house staffs (i.e., residents and 
fellows) in teaching hospitals.  Residency represents a new physician' s first assignment 
following medical school and typically lasts from three-to-five years depending on the 
doctor' s area of specialization.  In certain specialties, residency will be followed by a one- 
or two-year fellowship, during which the doctor receives further training in a sub-
specialty.  At the beginning of every July, the most senior residents move on to 
permanent medical positions or fellowships at other hospitals, and recent medical school 
graduates arrive as first-year residents, also known as interns.  This turnover leads to a 
significant lack of continuity and a discrete reduction in the average experience of the 
labor force at teaching hospitals every summer.  In addition, this changeover may disrupt 
established teams of doctors and other caregivers within hospitals.  Either of these effects 
                                                            
 
1 For example, Boylan (2004) examines turnover in the United States Attorney’s Office and finds 
that 40% of turnover between 1969 and 1999 occurred during a President’s first year in office. 
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may have potentially troubling consequences for the two determinants of hospital 
productivity—resource utilization and clinical quality. 
This “July phenomenon” is often mentioned in the lore of medical professionals.  
Many physicians have, perhaps jokingly, counseled patients not to get sick in July.  As of 
yet in the medical literature, however, any identified July phenomenon has been limited 
to declines in hospital efficiency (i.e. higher costs or lengths of hospital stay) without any 
significant impact on clinical outcomes, such as mortality.  As we discuss below, several 
of these studies are limited either by relatively small sample sizes or issues concerning 
their empirical strategy for identifying effects.   
We examine the impact of the July turnover on hospital productivity using data on 
all patient admissions from a large, multi-state sample of American hospitals over a five-
year period.  By comparing trends in teaching hospitals to those for non-teaching (i.e., 
control) hospitals over the course of the year, we find significant negative effects of the 
residency turnover on both hospital efficiency (as measured by average length of stay 
(LOS)) and clinical quality (as measured by risk-adjusted mortality rates).  Over some 
range, these effects appear to be increasing in the degree to which a hospital relies on 
residents (as measured by the number of residents per hospital bed).  Nevertheless, those 
hospitals with the highest levels of residents per bed (i.e., high teaching intensity) appear 
to be less affected—in terms of mortality—by the July phenomenon than facilities with 
medium teaching intensities.  We find initial evidence suggesting that this non-linearity 
in the July phenomenon may be due to higher levels of supervision for new residents at 
the most intensive teaching hospitals.  
4 
EMPLOYEE TURNOVER AND PRODUCTIVITY 
  As noted by several authors, (Staw, 1980; Mobley, 1982; Glebbeek and Bax, 
2004), there is significantly more literature examining the causes, rather than 
consequences, of turnover.  Further, the literature that does address the consequences of 
turnover is split over the direction of these effects.   
In his balanced review of the potential consequences of turnover, Staw (1980) 
notes several theoretical, negative effects of turnover on organizations.  These include 
selection, recruitment, and training costs for replacement workers, operational disruption, 
and demoralization of remaining workers.  In a sample of nearly 1,000 firms, Huselid 
(1995) found a negative relationship between turnover and productivity (measured by 
sales per employee) and corporate financial performance (as measured by Tobin' s q). 
One explanation for the hypothesized negative effect of turnover on productivity 
and performance is that job exits interfere with learning by individuals or teams.  Several 
studies find that worker productivity improves with experience
2 (Levhari and Sheshinski, 
1973; Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981; Maranto and Rodgers, 1984, Hellerstein and 
Neumark, 1995).  While experience with a given firm likely leads to higher productivity, 
the converse may also be true—more productive workers may be less likely to leave a 
firm (Jovanovic, 1979).  Further, Price (1977) notes that younger workers exhibit higher 
rates of turnover than older workers.  To the extent that instances of turnover are not 
randomly distributed across workers with different levels of underlying productivity, the 
turnover of individual employees may be an endogenous event. 
                                                            
2 Staw (1980) suggests that the opposite may be true.  In many settings, the relationship between 
tenure and performance may assume an inverted-U shape, with performance initially increasing and later 
decreasing with tenure. 
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To address this issue, several studies have used levels of union presence as a 
proxy for the workforce stability that firms experience in the absence of turnover.  Brown 
and Medoff (1978) suggest that this stability accounts for some portion of the positive 
relationship they observe between unionization and productivity.  Similarly, Clark (1980) 
finds a positive relationship between unionization and productivity, though he suggests 
that additional evidence is required to establish the degree to which this relationship is 
explained by lower turnover.  Freeman and Medoff (1984) provide a summary of the 
factors—including, but not limited to, lower turnover—that may explain this relationship.   
While these negative effects have received significant attention, several studies 
discuss turnover as a contingent, or even positive, phenomenon.
3  For example, Jovanovic 
(1979) presents turnover as a key element in the process of improving matches between 
employers and employees over time.  Staw (1980) describes performance as a function of 
both skill and effort.  As a result, in many settings—particularly high-stress professions 
that may lead to employee burnout—the relationship between tenure and performance 
may assume an inverted-U shape.  Employee skill will initially increase faster than effort 
decreases; as burnout begins, however, effort will decline faster than skill improves.  
Assuming that performance follows an inverted-U shape over time, turnover may thus 
improve average performance.  Beyond the replacement of less productive with more 
productive workers, turnover of poor performing employees may also serve to improve 
the morale and motivation of workers who remain with the firm (Staw, 1980). 
The replacement of low performing workers and the increased motivation of 
remaining employees both suggest that turnover could have particularly strong positive 
                                                            
3 Dalton and Todor (1979) and Staw (1980) provide reviews of both the positive and negative 
effects of turnover on performance.  
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effects in settings requiring substantial levels of innovation and adaptation (Dalton and 
Todor, 1979; Staw, 1980; Mobley, 1982).   In support of this claim, experimental work 
by Argote et al. (1995) finds that while turnover has a negative effect, on average, on 
group performance, this effect is more pronounced for simple tasks than for complex 
activities requiring innovation.  Argote and Epple (1990), however, also find that 
turnover does not appear to have a negative effect on firm productivity in settings where 
work is relatively standardized, as the knowledge required to perform a task is codified 
and can be easily transferred to new workers.  Together, these studies suggest that tasks 
requiring intermediate levels of innovation may be the most susceptible to performance 
declines following turnover. 
Beyond the nature of the task, several other factors may affect degree and 
direction of turnover' s impact on performance.  These include the degree of hierarchy 
within an organization (Carley, 1992), whether turnover itself is voluntary or involuntary 
(Price, 1977), whether turnover occurs in a predictable manner (Staw, 1980), and the 
absolute level of turnover in the organization.  With respect to this final factor, some have 
suggested that the relationship between turnover and performance exhibits an inverted-U 
shape with a medium level of turnover being preferred to both low and high levels 
(Abelson and Baysinger, 1984). 
Beyond its mixed findings, much of the prior work on turnover either explicitly or 
implicitly considers only individual turnover; significantly less attention has been 
devoted to cohort turnover, the phenomenon we consider in this paper.  One analog to 
cohort turnover whose performance implications have been considered in the literature is  
7 
the turnover of management teams (e.g., Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996).
4  It is not clear, 
however, how one should expect findings on management turnover to generalize to the 
performance of line workers.  While not a direct study of cohort turnover among line 
workers, Krueger and Mas (2004) find evidence that a period of significant labor 
unrest—including a strike and the large-scale use of replacement workers—in a Firestone 
tire plant was associated with reduced product quality.  The effects identified in their 
work speak to the impact of labor unrest on performance, but do not separate the effects 
of worker discontent from the impact of the cohort turnover that occurs when striking 
employees are replaced.    
One reason for the lack of attention to cohort turnover may be the fact that it 
occurs less frequently than individual turnover.  Nevertheless, it takes place in several 
important settings including military deployments, changes of political administrations, 
labor strikes, and, of course, annual house staff turnover in teaching hospitals.  A second 
reason for the lack of attention placed on cohort turnover may be the belief that the 
answers to questions concerning its effects are obvious—given the sheer magnitude of 
the change it brings, cohort turnover must have a detrimental impact on performance.  
Despite the magnitude of cohort turnover, however, it often occurs in a predictable 
fashion and the affected organizations should, theoretically, have time to prepare for its 
occurrence.  For example, attending physicians in teaching hospitals—being aware of the 
turnover that occurs each July—may focus intently on supervising new residents at that 
time of the year.  As a result, the impact of worker turnover in settings where the 
                                                            
 
4 Much of the literature on the turnover of management teams focuses on the determinants of such 
activity (e.g., Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer, 2005), thereby treating turnover as the 
dependent, rather than independent, variable. 
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supervisory staff (in this case, attending physicians) does not change over is not a priori 
obvious.
5  The presence of a stable cadre of potential supervisors in teaching hospitals 
allows us to examine the impact of supervision as a potential moderator of turnover’s 
effect on performance.  We return to this issue at the end of our empirical analysis. 
Perhaps the most attractive empirical characteristic of cohort turnover is that it 
typically occurs for exogenous reasons that are independent of the performance of 
individual workers.  Such changeovers are mandated as a matter of policy, as is the case 
with teaching hospitals where the annual turnover occurs regardless of the underlying 
productivity of the physicians and hospitals involved.  In contrast, instances of individual 
turnover may occur due to particular characteristics of the departing or entering worker—
such as motivation or ability—that remain unobserved by the researcher and may bias 
statistical estimates of turnover’s impact. 
 
COHORT TURNOVER IN TEACHING HOSPITALS 
It is widely agreed that teaching hospitals have two primary objectives—the 
provision of high quality medical care and the training of new doctors.  These related but 
distinct objectives overlap within medical residency programs.  Medical school graduates 
in the United States apply for residencies at any of the roughly 800 teaching hospitals in 
the country.  Depending on a physician’s specialty, residencies typically last for three-to-
five years, during which time residents represent an important piece of a hospital’s 
system for delivering care. 
                                                            
5 We also note that the non-physician clinical staff (e.g., nurses, technicians) in teaching hospitals 
does not turnover each July.  These individuals may provide informal supervision to new residents. 
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Patient care in teaching hospitals is provided by teams of medical professionals 
that include attending physicians, fellows, residents, and medical students.  Much of the 
care for patients is provided by a resident, who supervises medical students and is 
supervised by the chief (i.e., most senior) resident in that field and an attending physician.  
The daily activities of residents include admitting, treating, and discharging patients. In 
some departments, fellows (i.e., physicians who have completed their residencies) my 
provide an intermediate level of supervision between the residents and attending 
physicians. 
Residency programs in the United States are structured like schools.  Each class 
of residents enters together at the beginning of the academic year, and the senior 
members of the program all graduate together.  For residency programs, the year begins 
and ends on July 1
st.  The annual transition, however, does not occur all on one day.  
Typically, hospitals will complete the transition over a two-to-three week period, lasting 
from the middle of June through the first week of July. 
One might imagine that hospitals would transition the new interns into their 
positions slowly.  Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that each cohort of residents 
typically moves up one level and covers the entire set of responsibilities of the group it is 
replacing.  As a result, on day one new interns may have the same responsibilities that the 
now-second-year residents had at the end of June (i.e., after they had a full year of 
experience).   
The changeover creates the potential for turmoil in teaching hospitals as each 
cohort of doctors becomes comfortable with new roles and responsibilities.  With respect 
to this changeover, Claridge et al. (2001) note, “During this time of year, there is clearly  
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a feeling of apprehension among providers of health care, as well as among many 
patients.”  Gawande (2002) echoes these concerns: 
In medicine we have long faced a conflict between the imperative to give 
patients the best possible care and the need to provide novices with 
experience.  Residencies attempt to mitigate potential harm through 
supervision and graduated responsibility…But there is still no getting 
around those first few unsteady times a young physician tries to put in a 
central line, remove a breast cancer, or sew together two segments of 
colon.  No matter how many protections we put in place, on average these 
cases go less well with the novice than with someone experienced. 
These anecdotal observations suggest the need for systematic analysis of the implications 
of this annual turnover for medical productivity. 
  Most of the medical literature on staffing and performance in teaching hospitals 
deals with issues concerning limitations on resident work hours
6 or differences in 
outcomes on weekends and weekdays
7—two periods when the average level of on-duty-
physician experience is expected to differ substantially.  There exists a limited set of 
previous studies in the medical literature dealing with the July phenomenon.   
  Barry and Rosenthal (2003) test for a July phenomenon in a sample of 28 
hospitals in northeast Ohio.  Similar to our approach, they compare teaching and non-
teaching hospitals in terms of LOS and risk-adjusted mortality, though they focus solely 
on patients in intensive care units (ICUs).  They do not find evidence of the July 
phenomenon in this population, but do note that their findings may not generalize to non-
ICU patients.  Specifically, they suggest that, given the severity of patients in this setting, 
ICU residents may receive higher levels of supervision than their non-ICU counterparts. 
                                                            
6 Examples include Thorpe (1990), Laine et al. (1993), Leach (2000), Gaba and Howard (2002), 
Steinbrook (2002), and Weinstein (2002).  
 
 
7 Examples are Hendry (1981), Bell and Redelmeier (2001), and Dobkin (2002). 
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  Some studies find a link between the July turnover and hospital inefficiencies.  
Rich et al. (1993) examine several teaching hospitals in the Minneapolis area and find 
that doctors spend less money on diagnostic tests and pharmaceuticals as their experience 
increases throughout the academic year.  These results, however, applied only to medical 
(i.e., non-surgical) patients.  Rich et al. (1993) use a difference-in-differences approach, 
much as we do in this paper, to control for seasonal patterns.  They utilize patient 
outcomes in non-teaching hospitals as a baseline from which to estimate the impact of the 
July turnover for teaching hospitals.  They are able to identify some changes in efficiency 
but are unable to find any evidence of mortality differences.  Compared to our study, both 
Rich et al. (1993) and Barry and Rosenthal (2004) rely on data from a small number of 
hospitals, which may explain why they do not find significant effects on outcomes. 
While they do not directly test for the presence of a July phenomenon, Griffith, 
Wilson et al. (1997) examine patterns in test ordering among physicians in the neonatal 
intensive care unit at a single hospital.  They find that first-year interns are more likely to 
incur higher charges than their more experienced colleagues.  In addition to its small 
sample size, this study is limited by the fact that it does not consider effects on medical 
outcomes.  As such, it is difficult to determine whether these higher charges reflect 
beneficial attention to detail or unnecessary utilization due to inexperience. 
  A third study claims to reject the existence of a July phenomenon on any 
dimension for the trauma unit at one particular hospital (Claridge et al., 2001).  This 
paper compares patient outcomes in April and May with those in July and August and 
does not identify any significant differences between the two periods.  Given their study 
design, however, Claridge et al. (2001) are unable to control for seasonal variations in  
12 
patient outcomes that could affect outcomes at all hospitals regardless of teaching status.  
For example, as we will illustrate later, patients admitted to hospitals in the winter have 
higher mortality rates than those admitted in the summer.  Without some baseline to 
adjust for exogenous changes in patient outcomes, a comparison of outcomes for one 




  The primary source of data for this analysis is the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP) National Inpatient Sample (NIS) for each year from 1993 to 2001.
8  NIS 
contains discharge-level data for all inpatient cases at a sample of roughly 20% of the 
community hospitals
9 in the United States.  Depending on the year, NIS includes 
information for hospitals from between 17 and 33 states. 
  For each patient, NIS provides information on patient age and gender, expected 
primary payer (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, private including HMO, self pay, no charge, and 
other), length of stay (LOS), total charges, and in-hospital mortality.  In addition, NIS 
includes detailed data on a patient’s principal and secondary diagnoses, principal and 
secondary procedures, and diagnosis-related group (DRG). 
                                                            
8 The NIS database is administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
previously known as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR). 
 
9 The NIS definition of  “community hospital” is the same as that used by the American Hospital 
Association (AHA): “…‘all nonfederal, short-term, general, and other specialty hospitals, excluding 
hospital units of institutions.’  Included among community hospitals are specialty hospitals such as 
obstertrics-gynecology, ear-nose-throat, short-term rehabilitation, orthopedic, and pediatric.  Excluded are 
long-term hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, and alcoholism/chemical dependency treatment facilities 
(Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, 1999).”  
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  We link the NIS data with information from the AHA Annual Survey of 
Hospitals, which includes data on the operating and financial characteristics for more 
than 6,000 hospitals each year.  In addition to several other items, the AHA database 
provides information on the number of hospital beds and full-time residents (including 
interns) at each facility in a given year.  Using this information, we are able to construct 
our measure of teaching intensity—full-time residents per hospital bed.   
Our final sample of facilities is limited to those that appear in both the NIS and 
AHA databases.  The appendix presents the number of hospitals that appear in our 
sample and in the NIS by year.  For each year and state, the table provides the number of 
hospitals appearing in the NIS and in our matched NIS-AHA sample.  Most of the 
discrepancies between the matched sample and the NIS are due to the fact that certain 
states opted not to provide the hospital identifiers required to match NIS and AHA data in 
certain years.  In other rare cases, a hospital may appear in the NIS but not the matched 





  The source of identification in our empirical analysis is the varying degree to 
which certain types of hospitals rely on residents.  Initially, we divide hospitals into three 
categories—non-teaching hospitals, minor teaching hospitals, and major teaching 
hospitals.  Non-teaching hospitals are those that are not listed as teaching hospitals in the 
NIS.  These facilities have few, if any, residents.  As such, we would not expect them to 
be affected by the July changeover.  Those hospitals that are listed as teaching hospitals  
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in the NIS data are subdivided into two categories.  Minor teaching hospitals are those 
teaching hospitals that have resident intensities (i.e., full-time residents per inpatient 
hospital bed) that are less than 0.25, while major teaching hospitals are those facilities 
with teaching intensities equal to or greater than 0.25.  This threshold for resident 
intensity is used by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) to 
distinguish minor and major teaching facilities (Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, 2002). 
  Figure 1 illustrates that, in the aggregate, both LOS and mortality vary quite 
substantially throughout the calendar year.  Productivity appears to decline in the winter 
months, as evidenced by increases in both LOS and mortality during that period.  This 
pattern has been noted by epidemiologists (e.g., Gemmell et al., 2000) and has been 
attributed to a range of factors including the impact of seasonal disease (e.g., influenza 
and respiratory illness) and weather.  Key to the empirical strategy in our paper is the use 
of non-teaching hospitals as a control for these seasonal changes in outcomes, which 
should affect all hospitals regarding of teaching status.  We can thus calculate “de-
seasoned” trends in LOS and mortality for teaching hospitals to determine the extent of 
potential effects around the July turnover. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each of the three hospital categories as 
well as for the entire sample.  The first row illustrates the differences in average teaching 
intensity across the three groups.  This average measure increases from 0.01 for non-
teaching facilities to 0.10 and 0.53 for minor and major teaching hospitals, respectively.  
In terms of both measures of facility size—hospital beds and admissions per year—the 
hospitals get progressively larger as the level of teaching intensity increases.  Teaching  
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intensity is also correlated with the demographics of a hospital’s patient base.  In 
particular, non-teaching hospitals attract older patients than either type of teaching 
hospital.  The average age for patients at non-teaching facilities is 49.0 versus 45.0 and 
40.9 for minor and major teaching hospitals, respectively.  In addition to having younger 
patients, the major teaching hospitals in our sample also have a higher percentage of 
Medicaid patients than the other groups.  Moving from non-teaching to minor teaching to 
major teaching, this percentage increases from 15% to 17% to 26%.  This relationship is 
consistent with the fact that many teaching hospitals are located in densely populated 
cities. 
  The bottom portion of Table 1 presents information on the mortality rate and 
average length of stay (LOS) for each type of hospital.  The values are not adjusted for 
differences in the severity of the case mix at each type of facility.  While we perform 
more sophisticated risk-adjustment in our later analysis, here we simply present each rate 
for the entire population, as well as separately for patients younger than age 65 and those 
65 and older.  Average LOS increases with teaching intensity both for the entire 
population and each of the age groups.  This trend is consistent with the claim that major 
teaching hospitals tend to attract the most complex cases among the three groups.  
Overall mortality, however, is highest for the non-teaching facilities—2.7% versus 2.4% 
for the minor and major teaching group.  At first glance, this finding seems puzzling 
given the fact that the LOS data suggests that major teaching hospitals were attracting the 
most severe cases.  Analysis of mortality by age category, however, reveals that, within 
each group, the mortality rate either increases (age<65) or remains relatively flat (age 
65+) with teaching intensity.  These latter results suggest that the higher overall observed  
16 




Our multivariate analysis relies on a difference-in-differences framework that 
follows the relative changes in risk-adjusted LOS and mortality for the three groups of 
hospitals over the course of the year.  The basic specification takes the following form: 
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where Y represents the dependent variable of interest (i.e., risk-adjusted average LOS or 
risk-adjusted mortality).   
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (1) are vectors of fixed effects for 
hospital and year, respectively.  The third term, mm, represents a vector of fixed effects for 
six multi-month periods during the year—January through March, April through May, 
June, July through August, September through October, and November through 
December.  Given that the residency changeover begins in late June for many hospitals, 
we isolate that month and then compare the change in the dependent variable from April-
May to July-August for teaching hospitals to the similar change for non-teaching 
hospitals to measure the impact of the July turnover.
10 
                                                            
10 Due to the fact that the residency changeover begins in 3
rd and 4
th weeks of June at several 
hospitals, mortality and LOS results for that month represent a mixture of outcomes from both before and 
after the transition.  We thus use the comparison of July-August to April-May to measure the July  
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MIN_TCH and MAJ_TCH are indicators for minor and major teaching hospitals, 
respectively.
11  The next two terms on the right-hand side of (1) are vectors of 
interactions between the teaching hospital categories and the month effects.  The 
coefficients on the MIN_TCH (MAJ_TCH) interactions thus capture the extent to which 
any seasonal pattern that is found for minor (major) teaching hospitals differs from that 
for the non-teaching controls.  Each of the observations in (1) is weighted by the total 
number of cases for the hospital-month pair to account for the fact that all of the 
dependent variables are averages.  Finally, the standard errors are clustered by hospital to 
address potential lack of independence in the error term, eh,m,t. 
 
Risk-Adjustment of Dependent Variables 
As suggested in Table 1, the average severity of patients likely differs across the 
three types of hospitals.  To the extent that the differences in patient severity for major 
teaching, minor teaching, and non-teaching hospitals vary systematically over the course 
of the year, risk adjustment is required to ensure proper identification of any July 
phenomenon.  For example, to the degree that relatively healthy individuals in the 
population aged 65 and older move from cold climates in northeastern states—which tend 
to have a high concentration of teaching hospitals—to warmer southern and western 
                                                                                                                                                                             
phenomenon.  This difference captures the change in the dependent variables from the two complete 
months that precede the beginning of the changeover for any hospital to the two complete months that fall 
after its conclusion for all hospitals.  
 
11 Despite the inclusion of hospital fixed effects, the uniteracted coefficients on minor (b1)and 
major (b2) teaching status are identified by those facilities that change between minor and major teaching 
status across years.  For example, a hospital may have a teaching intensity of 0.25 (making it a minor 
teaching hospital) in one year and 0.30 (making it a major teaching hospital) in the next. 
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states during the winter months, the mortality risk for the hospitalized population in the 
northeast will increase ceteris paribus during this period of the year. 
The covariates in our risk-adjustment equation are patient age; age squared; 
gender; an indicator for Medicaid as the primary payment source; indicators for a 
patient’s state of residence; interactions of the state indicators with both the linear and 
quadratic age terms; and the Charlson index—a measure of comorbidities that increase a 
patient’s risk of mortality (Charlson et al., 1987).  The Medicaid variable is included as a 
proxy for the patient’s socioeconomic status.
12  The interactions of the state-of-residence 
and age terms are included to control for the fact that the average severity of patients, 
conditional on age, may vary across geography. 
Given that the in-hospital mortality variable is binary, we use logistic regression 
to obtain estimated probability of death for each patient discharge.  For LOS, we use a 
simple linear regression to calculate predicted values.  The risk-adjustment equations are 
run separately for each calendar year.  The observed and expected values for mortality 
and LOS are then averaged by hospital and month.  The risk-adjusted value of each 
dependent variable is calculated as the ratio of the observed-to-expected rate for a given 
hospital-year.  For example, the risk-adjusted mortality rate (RAMRh,m,t) is: 
t
t , m , h
t , m , h
t , m , h OMR
EMR
OMR
RAMR * =             (2) 
 
                                                            
12 With linear and quadratic terms for patient age included in the regression, we do not include a 
separate term for Medicare status.  While it would be useful to include an indicator for HMO patients—
who may be healthier, on average, than patients in other payer categories—the HCUP data does not 
distinguish HMO patients from those with other forms of private insurance (e.g., indemnity).  
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where OMRh,m,t and EMRh,m,t are the observed and expected mortality rates, respectively, 
for hospital h in month m of year t.  OMRt is the average mortality rate for the entire 
sample in year t and is used simply to normalize the value of RAMRh,m,t. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Base Results 
Table 2 presents results from our estimation of (1), the basic regression using 
three discrete categories of teaching status.  The coefficients in this table represent the 
change in the dependent variable for minor and major teaching hospitals relative to the 
change for non-teaching hospitals over the same period.  As noted earlier, we use the 
period just prior to the resident turnover (April - May) as the baseline.  A positive 
coefficient thus indicates that, on average, the hospital group in question experiences a 
larger increase in the outcome measure than does the non-teaching group over the same 
period of time.  For example, the value of 0.040 for the September-October coefficient 
for the minor teaching group (Column 1) suggests that the change in LOS from April-
May to September-October is 0.040 days greater for minor teaching than for non-
teaching hospitals.  Similarly, the November-December coefficient for the same group 
suggests that change in LOS from April-May to November-December is 0.036 days 
greater for minor than for non-teaching hospitals. 
For our purposes, the coefficients of greatest interest are those in the period just 
following the resident turnover (i.e., July-August).  In terms of LOS (Column 1), the 
July-August coefficient for minor teaching hospitals is 0.049 and is significant at the 1% 
level.  To provide a perspective on the magnitude of this effect, we note that the average  
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risk-adjusted LOS for minor teaching hospitals is 5.3 days.  If we assume that LOS is 
proportional to hospital costs, these results suggest that costs increase by roughly 0.9% 
following the July turnover. 
The estimated coefficients on LOS for minor teaching hospitals decline somewhat 
in magnitude during the months from September to December and remain significantly 
different from the April-May baseline.  By January-March, LOS falls back to its value in 
the April-May period.  Nevertheless, the coefficients for September-October and 
November-December are not significantly different than that for July-August, so we are 
not able to reject the hypothesis that LOS for minor teaching hospitals increases in July-
August and remains at that higher level for the final four months of the calendar year.  
The January-March coefficient, while not significantly different from April-May, is 
significantly lower than the July-August value at the 1% level.   This reduction in the 
estimated coefficient over the course of the academic year suggests that house staffs may 
benefit from experience-based improvement in performance over time. 
Consistent with the view that the July phenomenon should increase with the 
intensity of a hospital' s teaching program, we find that, relative to minor teaching 
hospitals, major teaching facilities show even stronger evidence of such a trend in LOS.  
Specifically, these hospitals experience a positive and significant increase in LOS relative 
to non-teaching hospitals following the July turnover, and the effect remains for 
approximately six months.  This increase appears to begin in June, and the estimated 
coefficient for that month (0.057) is significant at the 5% level.
13  The effect, however, 
appears to strengthen in terms of both magnitude (0.111) and significance (1%) in the 
                                                            
13 As noted earlier, June represents a mixture of days before and after the turnover at many 
hospitals.  The coefficient on June may thus underestimate the immediate impact of the turnover.  
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July-August period.  This effect represents a 1.9% increase relative to the average LOS 
for major teaching hospitals (5.80 days).   As with minor teaching hospitals, the effects 
for September through December are significantly different from the April-May baseline 
and decline in estimated magnitude over time.  Again, however, these coefficients are not 
statistically distinguishable from the July-August estimate.  By January-March, LOS falls 
to the point where it is insignificantly different from April-May, but significantly lower 
than the July-August coefficient.  These results provide additional support for the 
contention that house staffs learn over the course of the academic year.  
The fact that LOS, and, in turn, resource utilization, increase following the July 
turnover does not provide conclusive evidence concerning its effects on medical 
productivity.  To address this issue, one also needs to consider the impact of this turnover 
on medical quality.  Column 2 presents results using risk-adjusted mortality—a proxy for 
quality—as the dependent variable.  While minor teaching hospitals do not experience 
significant changes in mortality during the course of the academic year, major teaching 
facilities do show evidence of a July phenomenon with respect to this outcome measure.  
As with LOS, major teaching hospitals experience an increase in their risk-adjusted 
mortality rate in June.  This increase of 0.063 percentage points is significant at the 10% 
level.  For the July-August period, the magnitude of this effect nearly doubles (to 0.122 
percentage points) and becomes significant at the 1% level.  The magnitude of this July 
phenomenon represents a 4.3% increase relative to the average mortality rate of 2.82% 
for major teaching hospitals.  Evidence of learning is again present in the coefficients for 
the remainder of the academic year; the levels for September-October and November-
December are both significantly different from April-May; the level for January-March— 
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though not distinguishable from April-May—is significantly lower than that for July-
August.  While suggestive of learning, these results also imply that the negative effects of 
the July turnover linger—albeit at slightly lower magnitudes—for the months from 
August through December. 
 
Testing for Patient Self-Selection and Increased Transfers 
  While consistent with declines in medical productivity following cohort turnover, 
our results are also consistent with alternate explanations.  One leading hypothesis is that 
patients recognize July to be a time of turmoil for teaching hospitals and that those with 
choice (i.e., elective patients) decide to avoid those facilities at that time of the year.  Of 
course, these elective patients are likely to be relatively healthier than those who lack 
choice regarding their admission to the hospital.  This self-selection of the patient base 
could thus leave teaching hospitals with relatively sicker patient populations at precisely 
the time we estimate their resource use to be increasing and their outcomes to be 
declining.  If such selection were occurring, we would be mistaken to attribute the effects 
we observe to a decline in productivity. 
  We offer a test of the selection hypothesis in Column 3 of Table 2.  If patients are 
in fact self-selecting away from teaching hospitals in July and August, then teaching 
hospitals should experience a decline in their number of admissions relative to non-
teaching facilities during those months.  We estimate a regression of the same form as 
(1), but with the number of hospital admissions on the left-hand side.  The results are not 
consistent with a self-selection story.  In particular, the coefficient in the July-August 
time period for major teaching hospitals—the period most critical for the analysis of the  
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July phenomenon—is positive.  This effect is actually in the opposite direction of that 
which one would expect under the self-selection hypothesis.   
  The positive coefficient on admissions for major teaching hospitals in July-
August is related to a second potential explanation for our base results:  that major 
teaching hospitals are receiving a higher percentage of patients transferred from minor 
teaching or non-teaching hospitals during the summer months due to the presence of 
excess hospital capacity during warmer months.  In Column 4, we thus repeat our 
analysis using the percentage of cases transferred from another hospital as the dependent 
variable.  Again, we find no systematic change in transfer rates for either minor or major 
teaching hospitals around the July turnover. 
 
Robustness and Extensions 
Results Using Medicaid Patients 
  To test the robustness of our base results, we take advantage of the empirical 
regularity that Medicaid recipients are more likely to be treated by house staff physicians 
than are patients with private health insurance.  This phenomenon is typically attributed 
to the fact that Medicaid recipients are less likely to have a regular source of physician 
care than those with private insurance.  James Tallon, president of the United Hospital 
Fund, noted this fact in reaction to his organization' s study of Medicaid in New York 
City:   
‘These findings indicate the medical residents play a major role in 
providing primary care for low-income people who rely on Medicaid…  
As these Medicaid beneficiaries are enrolled into managed care, we need 
to evaluate whether we can accomplish the goals of managed care—
providing coordinated and continuous care—while relying so heavily on 
this workforce of doctors in training.’ (United Hospital Fund, 1999)  
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To the extent that residents play a disproportionately large role in the treatment of 
Medicaid patients, we would expect that the July phenomenon should be even more 
pronounced for these individuals than for the rest of the population. 
  Table 3 presents results for LOS and mortality separately for the Medicaid and 
non-Medicaid populations.  In terms of LOS, both the Medicaid and non-Medicaid 
populations show evidence of an increase for major teaching hospitals following the July 
turnover.  While the July-August coefficient is slightly bigger in absolute magnitude for 
Medicaid (0.126) than for non-Medicaid (0.097) patients, the two coefficients are nearly 
identical in terms of magnitude relative to the mean LOS for their respective populations.  
Further, the coefficient for the Medicaid population is significant at 10% versus 1% for 
the non-Medicaid group.  Another difference between the Medicaid and non-Medicaid 
populations with respect to LOS is that the latter does show evidence of a July 
phenomenon for minor teaching hospitals that is not present for the former. 
  With respect to mortality, the July-August coefficient for major teaching hospitals 
is substantially larger for the Medicaid (0.251) than for the non-Medicaid population 
(0.093).  Relative to the mean mortality rate for each population at major teaching 
hospitals, the coefficient for the Medicaid group represents a 7.3% increase while that for 
the non-Medicaid group translates into a 3.4% increase.  While each coefficient is 
significantly different from zero, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that these 
two coefficients are the same.
14  Nonetheless, the fact that the coefficient for the 
                                                            
14 To test whether these coefficients are the same, we pooled the Medicaid and non-Medicaid 
observations and interaction the time period indicators for each type of hospital with a Medicaid indicator.  
We then examined the significance of the coefficient on these interaction terms.  The coefficient on this 
interaction for major teaching hospitals in July-August was significant at the 16% level, suggesting that we 
cannot statistically distinguish the coefficients for the Medicaid and non-Medicaid populations.  
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Medicaid population is notably larger in both absolute and relative terms than that for the 
non-Medicaid group is consistent with the story that the effects we are seeing are due to 
the July turnover. 
   
Results Using Narrower Categories of Teaching Intensity 
Our base findings suggest that the negative impact of the July turnover on 
productivity is increasing in teaching intensity (i.e. major teaching hospitals are more 
affected than minor teaching hospitals).  Intuitively, this makes sense, as teaching 
intensity captures the degree to which a hospital relies on residents and, therefore, should 
be correlated with the magnitude of the turmoil created by resident turnover.  
Nevertheless, it is not theoretically clear that the relationship between teaching intensity 
and the magnitude of the July phenomenon need be either linear or even monotonic.  To 
more directly test for potential non-linearity in this relationship, we estimate versions of 
(1) in which we further divide the major teaching category into thirds on the basis of 
teaching intensity.
15 
  Table 4 presents the results of these regressions.  We focus on the coefficients for 
the three thirds of major teaching hospitals, as the results for the minor teaching group are 
the same as in Table 2.  For LOS, the July-August coefficient is positive and significant 
for all three thirds.  The magnitude of this coefficient increases from 0.086 for the lower 
third to 0.125 for the middle third and slightly decreases to 0.120 for the upper third 
                                                            
15 Teaching intensities for the lower third of major teaching hospitals range from 0.25 to 0.34 




(Column 1).  None of these coefficients are statistically different from the other two at 
conventional levels.   
The results for risk-adjusted mortality (Column 2), however, differ somewhat 
from those for LOS.  Specifically, the July phenomenon appears to be focused in the 
lower and middle thirds, but is not present in the upper third.  The effects for the first two 
groups (0.172 and 0.152, respectively) are both significantly different from zero and from 
the coefficient for the minor teaching category, but are not significantly different from 
each other.  The effect for the upper third is substantially smaller in magnitude (0.054) 
than that for the lower and middle thirds and is not significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels.  While the decline from the middle to upper thirds is only significant 
at the 16% level, it is not clear if this reflects a true lack of significance or if it is simply 
due to the relatively small sample size within each third of the major teaching category.  
Nonetheless, these results suggest that the July phenomenon with respect to risk-adjusted 
mortality does appear to diminish for the most-intensive teaching hospitals.  Column 3 
again suggests that the observed July phenomenon is not due to patient self-selection 
away from major teaching hospitals around the July turnover. 
 
Results Using Supervision Proxies 
One can imagine two leading explanations for the non-linear July phenomenon (at 
least with respect to mortality) observed in Table 4.  First, it is possible that the most-
intensive teaching programs (e.g., the upper third of major teaching) are more aware of or 
sensitive to the possibility of performance declines around the July turnover.  As a result, 
these programs may provide higher levels of supervision to their house staffs in an effort  
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to avoid major disruptions.  Alternatively, the most-intensive programs may be more 
likely to be highly prestigious and attract residents and fellows who are capable of 
learning more rapidly than those at lower-intensity programs.  We refer to these two 
explanations as the supervision and worker ability stories, respectively. 
While we cannot definitively distinguish between these two explanations, we do 
provide some suggestive evidence in Table 5.  We supplement our existing data with 
information from the American Medical Association’s FREIDA database, which provides 
annual information on the number of residents and attending physicians for individual 
residency programs within teaching hospitals.  We were able to obtain this data for each 
year from 1994 through 2000.  For each hospital and year, we calculate the ratio of full-
time attending physicians to residents as a weighted average across all of a hospital’s 
medical and surgical teaching programs.  We use this ratio as a proxy for the level of 
supervision provided to house staff at a given teaching hospital.  This ratio is a not a 
perfect proxy, as it reflects only potential (not actual) supervision levels and does not 
account for unobserved factors.  Nevertheless, it represents a reasonable approximation 
of our variable of interest. 
As a proxy for worker (i.e., house staff) ability, we use an indicator for whether 
that facility was ranked as a top hospital in the United States by U.S. News & World 
Report in at least one major specialty category in 2002.  In that year, 205 acute care 
hospitals (3.4% of the 6,045 considered) in the United States were included in this group 
(Comarow, 2002).  Though being included in this list is not a perfect measure of the 
prestige of a hospital’s teaching programs, it does represent a reasonable proxy.  
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In the first two columns of Table 5, we divide major teaching hospitals into low- 
and high-supervision groups.  We assign major teaching hospitals to high- and low-
supervision groups based on their attending-to-resident ratio in each year.
16  Table 5 
presents the results of these regressions using different thresholds to define major 
teaching hospitals with high supervision levels.  The first two rows show the July-August 
coefficients of interest from regressions where high-supervision hospitals are defined as 
the top 50% of major teaching hospitals with respect to the attending-to-resident ratio.  
Thus, the “Major Teaching” coefficient suggests that major teaching hospitals with 
supervision levels in the lower 50% had an increase in LOS of 0.108 days in July-August.  
For high-supervision, major teaching hospitals, the estimated increase is smaller at 0.066 
(=0.108-0.042) days.  While the July-August increase for high-supervision hospitals 
remains significantly different from zero at the 10% level, it is not significantly different 
from the 0.108 increase for low-supervision hospitals.   
The first two rows of Column 2 show similar results with respect to risk-adjusted 
mortality.  Low-supervision hospitals in the major teaching group show a July-August 
increase of 0.156 (significant at the 10% level).  The magnitude of this increase declines 
to 0.090 (=0.156-0.066) for high-supervision hospitals and is significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level.  As seen by the coefficient on “Major Teaching x High 
Supervision”, the July-August increase is not significantly different for the high- and 
low-supervision groups. 
The next four rows of Table 5 show analogous results for regressions where high-
supervision hospitals are defined as those in the top 33% and top 20% of major teaching 
                                                            
16 A given hospital may thus be in the high-supervision group in one year and in the low-
supervision group in the following year.  
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hospitals, respectively, in terms of their supervision ratios.  With respect to LOS, these 
more stringent definitions of “high-supervision” hospitals do not have much of an effect 
on the results reported above—low- and high-supervision hospitals in the major teaching 
group experience similar increases in LOS in the July-August period.   
The results for mortality are also consistent across the various definitions of high 
supervision with one notable exception.  The final two rows of Column 2 suggest that, 
when high-supervision is defined as the top 20% of major teaching hospitals, high-
supervision hospitals experience a significantly smaller increase in mortality during the 
July-August period.  This decline in the July phenomenon of 0.146 percentage points is 
significant at the 10% level.  Further, it reduces the overall July phenomenon for high-
supervision hospitals to 0.004 percentage points (insignificantly different from zero at 
conventional levels).  This result suggests that major teaching hospitals with very high-
levels of supervision appear to be able to avoid the adverse impact of the July changeover 
on mortality performance. 
Of course, it is possible that those hospitals with the highest levels of supervision 
are also those with the highest levels of worker ability.  In the next two columns of Table 
5, we also split major teaching hospitals into two groups based on whether or not they 
were ranked as a top hospital in at least one major specialty.  The results of the LOS 
regressions in Column 3 are similar to those in Column 1.  While the ranked, major 
teaching hospitals did have higher estimated increases in LOS than their unranked 
counterparts, the coefficients for the two groups were not significantly different from 
each other.  The mortality results in Column 4 are also similar to those in Column 2.  We 
note that, when high supervision is defined as the top 20% of hospitals, the decline of 
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0.123 percentage points in the July-August coefficient is no longer significant at 
conventional levels; it is, however, significant at the 15% level, and the overall effect for 
high-supervision hospitals of 0.039 (=0.162-0.123) is insignificantly different from zero 
(as in Column 2). 
One might be concerned that the high supervision and ranking variables are so 
highly correlated that it is not possible to identify independent effects.  We address this 
issue in two ways.  First, we note that the weighted correlation between high supervision 
(defined by the 20% threshold) and being ranked is only 0.31.  Second, the final two 
columns of Table 5 illustrate the effect of hospitals being ranked without controlling for 
supervision levels.  We find that ranked, major teaching hospitals experience a July 
phenomenon that is 0.10 percentage points smaller than that for their unranked 
counterparts.  Nevertheless, this difference is not significant at conventional levels, 
though it is significant at the 15% level.  It is possible that, with more refined data, we 
might find that higher levels of house-staff ability reduce the magnitude of the July 
phenomenon.  That said, our initial results suggest that supervision—particularly at very 
high levels—may play a role in mitigating the disruptive effects of turnover for major 




  This study examines the relationship between cohort turnover and productivity 
using a unique setting in which turnover occurs exogenously—the July turnover of house 
staffs in teaching hospitals.  We find that both minor and major teaching hospitals 
experience a significant increase in resource utilization—measured by average LOS— 
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immediately following the July turnover, and that the effect appears to last for several 
months.  We also find that teaching hospitals with medium teaching intensity experience 
a significant increase in patient mortality over the same period.  The confluence of 
increased resource utilization and increased mortality (i.e., decreased quality) during the 
July-August period implies that this cohort turnover reduces medical productivity.  
Nevertheless, those hospitals with the highest teaching intensities (i.e., the greatest 
reliance on residents for the provision of care), seem to avoid the disruption of the July 
phenomenon with respect to changes in their average mortality rates.  We provide 
preliminary evidence suggesting that higher supervision levels play a role in mitigating 
the impact of the July turnover in major teaching facilities. 
  The magnitude of the estimated effects is substantial and appears to last for 
roughly six months.  We find that average LOS—our proxy for resource utilization and 
cost—for the average, major teaching hospital increases by roughly 2% following the 
July turnover and remains between 1% and 2% higher throughout the final six months of 
the calendar year.  Similarly, the average, major teaching hospital experiences an increase 
in risk-adjusted mortality of roughly 4% (not percentage points) in the July-August 
period.  This effect also remains at levels between 2% and 4% for the last six months of 
the calendar year.  For the average major teaching hospital, this translates into between 
7.8 and 13.8 “accelerated” deaths (i.e., deaths that occur earlier than they would have 
occurred in the absence of the July turnover) per year.  Based on a total of roughly 200 
major teaching hospitals in the United States, the July phenomenon is thus associated 
with roughly 1,500 to 2,750 accelerated deaths per year in the United States.
17  
                                                            
17 To the extent that this effect is sizeable, one might ask why it may go unnoticed by teaching 
hospitals.  A possible answer to this question is that the July phenomenon occurs at a time of the year when  
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Determining the social cost of this increase in mortality requires assumptions about the 
expected longevity of these individuals in the absence of the July turnover.  Such 
assumptions are beyond the scope of this paper. 
  Beyond its findings with respect to the July phenomenon, this paper has broader 
implications for the study of the effects of labor turnover on organizations.  It provides 
empirical support for the contention that cohort turnover has negative implications for 
productivity on average, though these effects do not increase linearly with the intensity of 
turnover.  We find initial evidence suggesting that supervision can mitigate this negative 
effect.  This latter finding implies that, even if firms are not able to reduce the levels of 
turnover they face, they may be able to manage its effects. 
One question that is not addressed by our study is the degree to which managers 
should be concerned about turnover-related declines in productivity.  On one hand, these 
declines likely reflect the costs associated with valuable on-the-job training.  On the 
other, they may be larger than necessary to obtain the desired training benefit for new 
employees.  In the case of teaching hospitals, we thus are not arguing that an optimal 
residency system would result in no systematic change in productivity throughout the 
year.  Presumably, no system can guarantee that residents will be as productive at the 
beginning of their tenure as they will be at its end.  Ultimately, the important question to 
answer is whether declines in productivity are higher than necessary to train new workers 
efficiently.  The question of optimal supervision levels in the face of significant on-the-
job training is an interesting issue for further study in contexts both within and outside of 
the hospital industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the overall trend in mortality is declining.  As a result, an increase in mortality relative to non-teaching 
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Average LOS Mortality Rate
 
Source: NIS, 1993-2001.  
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Residents Per Inpatient Bed 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.53 0.28 0.10 0.19
Inpatient Hospital Beds 135        115           337        206           493        260           187        177          
Inpatient Admissions/Year 4,824     5,016        13,923   8,562        21,222   10,049      7,181     7,684       
Patient Age 49.0 9.2 45.0 9.0 40.9 8.2 46.5 9.4
Medicaid Admissions/Total Admissions 15% 13% 17% 14% 26% 16% 17% 14%
Medicare Admissions/Total Admissions 39% 14% 33% 12% 26% 10% 35% 14%
Observed Average Length of Stay
Total 4.8 2.2 5.2 1.4 5.9 1.4 5.1 1.9
Age<65 3.7 1.9 4.4 1.3 5.4 1.3 4.2 1.7
Age 65+ 6.5 3.0 6.9 1.9 7.5 2.2 6.7 2.7
Observed Mortality
Total 2.6% 1.6% 2.4% 0.7% 2.4% 0.7% 2.5% 1.3%
Age<65 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 0.4% 1.4% 0.5% 1.0% 0.8%
Age 65+ 5.3% 2.2% 5.2% 1.3% 5.4% 1.5% 5.3% 1.9%
Observations (hospital-years)
Percentage of Total Sample
4,873 1,041 318 6,232
Non-Teaching Minor Teaching Major Teaching Full Sample
78.2% 16.7% 5.1%
 
Note:  Observations are at the hospital-year level and cover the five-year period from 1993 to 2001. 
 
Source: NIS, 1993-2001.  
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Table 2:  Base Regressions Using Minor and Major Teaching Categories 
 
Minor Teaching
Jan-Mar -0.003 (0.012) -0.012 (0.018) 1.5 (3.4) -0.02 (0.04)
Apr-May
June 0.010 (0.016) 0.006 (0.024) -8.0 (2.8) *** -0.02 (0.04)
Jul-Aug 0.049 (0.013) *** 0.014 (0.019) -0.5 (3.2) -0.03 (0.04)
Sep-Oct 0.040 (0.012) *** 0.003 (0.020) -5.2 (3.1) * -0.03 (0.05)
Nov-Dec 0.036 (0.014) *** -0.008 (0.020) -25.9 (3.9) *** 0.02 (0.06)
Major Teaching
Jan-Mar 0.018 (0.021) -0.037 (0.027) 4.7 (8.2) 0.03 (0.06)
Apr-May
June 0.057 (0.028) ** 0.063 (0.034) * -5.6 (8.2) 0.05 (0.06)
Jul-Aug 0.111 (0.024) *** 0.122 (0.039) *** 30.6 (8.8) *** -0.09 (0.08)
Sep-Oct 0.092 (0.021) *** 0.088 (0.043) ** 2.9 (8.9) -0.01 (0.08)
Nov-Dec 0.073 (0.020) *** 0.074 (0.037) ** -31.6 (9.1) *** 0.14 (0.07) **






*,**, and *** denote statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
0.822
Change in Dependent Variable Relative to Non-Teaching Baseline (Reference 
Period=April-May)
Note:  The level of observation is the hospital-month.  All regressions include fixed effects for hospital, year, and multi-month period, 
though these coefficients are not shown in the table for ease of presentation.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity 
robust and clustered by hospital.  In regressions with risk-adjusted LOS and risk-adjusted mortality as the dependent variable, 





















Table 3: Regressions on Medicaid and Non-Medicaid Populations 
 
Minor Teaching
Jan-Mar -0.059 (0.052) -0.182 (0.083) ** 0.004 (0.012) 0.003 (0.017)
Apr-May
June 0.091 (0.062) -0.011 (0.115) -0.003 (0.016) 0.009 (0.024)
Jul-Aug 0.059 (0.051) -0.103 (0.093) 0.045 (0.012) *** 0.026 (0.019)
Sep-Oct 0.074 (0.048) -0.134 (0.086) 0.035 (0.012) *** 0.018 (0.020)
Nov-Dec 0.100 (0.051) ** -0.207 (0.092) ** 0.026 (0.014) ** 0.010 (0.019)
Major Teaching
Jan-Mar -0.014 (0.058) 0.014 (0.084) 0.027 (0.024) -0.032 (0.028)
Apr-May
June 0.087 (0.091) 0.194 (0.115) * 0.048 (0.024) ** 0.027 (0.036)
Jul-Aug 0.126 (0.070) * 0.251 (0.110) ** 0.097 (0.019) *** 0.093 (0.038) **
Sep-Oct 0.135 (0.076) * 0.142 (0.096) 0.078 (0.017) *** 0.072 (0.040) *
Nov-Dec 0.119 (0.068) * 0.082 (0.111) 0.063 (0.022) *** 0.070 (0.039) *






*,**, and *** denote statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.





Note:  The level of observation is the hospital-month.  All regressions include fixed effects for hospital, year, and multi-month period, 
though these coefficients are not shown in the table for ease of presentation.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by hospital.  In regressions with risk-adjusted LOS and risk-adjusted mortality as the 



















Table 4: Regressions Using Major-Teaching Subcategories 
 
Minor Teaching
Jan-Mar -0.003 (0.012) -0.012 (0.018) 1.537 (3.437)
Apr-May
June 0.010 (0.016) 0.006 (0.024) -7.978 (2.762) ***
Jul-Aug 0.049 (0.013) *** 0.014 (0.019) -0.454 (3.234)
Sep-Oct 0.040 (0.012) *** 0.003 (0.020) -5.217 (3.084) *
Nov-Dec 0.036 (0.014) ** -0.009 (0.020) -25.919 (3.905) ***
Major Teaching
Lower Third
Jan-Mar 0.005 (0.029) -0.026 (0.050) 25.548 (12.836) **
Apr-May
June 0.051 (0.034) 0.032 (0.050) -15.866 (20.378)
Jul-Aug 0.086 (0.028) *** 0.172 (0.087) ** 18.759 (14.384)
Sep-Oct 0.074 (0.029) ** 0.096 (0.096) -4.515 (11.793)
Nov-Dec 0.075 (0.033) ** 0.142 (0.072) ** -14.258 (13.929)
Middle Third
Jan-Mar 0.085 (0.039) ** -0.042 (0.045) -10.918 (13.541)
Apr-May
June 0.027 (0.055) 0.106 (0.053) ** -3.480 (9.388)
Jul-Aug 0.125 (0.058) ** 0.152 (0.056) *** 23.981 (12.723) *
Sep-Oct 0.102 (0.056) * 0.086 (0.061) -1.929 (11.254)
Nov-Dec 0.089 (0.047) * 0.028 (0.074) -27.852 (15.348) *
Upper Third
Jan-Mar -0.025 (0.024) -0.043 (0.036) -0.790 (14.165)
Apr-May
June 0.088 (0.039) ** 0.055 (0.057) 2.400 (11.215)
Jul-Aug 0.120 (0.031) *** 0.054 (0.044) 48.835 (16.910) ***
Sep-Oct 0.100 (0.024) *** 0.084 (0.050) * 15.018 (20.280)
Nov-Dec 0.059 (0.024) ** 0.053 (0.032) -52.478 (15.186) ***














*,**, and *** denote statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Note:  The level of observation is the hospital-month.  All regressions include fixed effects for hospital, 
year, and multi-month period, though these coefficients are not shown in the table for ease of 
presentation.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by hospital.  
In regressions with risk-adjusted LOS and risk-adjusted mortality as the dependent variable, 










Table 5: July-August Coefficients for Categories of Major Teaching Hospitals 
 
High Supervision = Top 50%
Major Teaching 0.108 (0.032) *** 0.156 (0.094) * 0.103 (0.031) *** 0.162 (0.094) * 0.101 (0.028) *** 0.145 (0.047) ***
Major Teaching x High Supervision -0.042 (0.049) -0.066 (0.105) -0.060 (0.057) -0.038 (0.107)
Major Teaching x Ranked 0.058 (0.057) -0.091 (0.074) 0.045 (0.043) -0.100 (0.064)
High Supervision = Top 33%
Major Teaching 0.086 (0.036) ** 0.133 (0.064) ** 0.080 (0.038) ** 0.148 (0.068) **
Major Teaching x High Supervision -0.006 (0.044) -0.040 (0.083) -0.016 (0.042) -0.012 (0.081)
Major Teaching x Ranked 0.038 (0.043) -0.102 (0.075)
High Supervision = Top 20%
Major Teaching 0.083 (0.030) *** 0.150 (0.054) *** 0.077 (0.034) ** 0.162 (0.059) ***
Major Teaching x High Supervision 0.005 (0.050) -0.146 (0.082) * -0.005 (0.049) -0.123 (0.084)
Major Teaching x Ranked 0.034 (0.046) -0.070 (0.080)
Observations
*,**, and *** denote statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
73,287 73,287 73,287
Risk-Adjusted LOS Risk-Adjusted LOS
Risk-Adjusted 
Mortality
Change in Dependent Variable Relative to Non-Teaching Baseline (Reference Period=April-May)
Note:  The level of observation is the hospital-month.  All regressions include fixed effects for hospital, year, and multi-month period, though these coefficients are not 
shown in the table for ease of presentation.  Regressions also include a full set of interactions with multi-month periods for each of the following variables: minor 
teaching, major teaching, major teaching x high supervision, and (in Columns 3 and 4) major teaching x ranked.  For ease of presentation, only the July-August 
coefficients for the various types of major teaching hospitals appear in the table.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by 
hospital.  Observations are weighted by the total number of cases for the relevant hospital-month.  The smaller sample size in the first four columns is due to the fact 































Arizona 13 13 12 12 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 14 13 13 14 14 12 12
California 95 96 101 102 104 105 102 103 106 107 97 97 95 95 93 93 94 94
Colorado 27 28 21 22 21 22 21 21 18 18 20 20 18 18 22 22 18 18
Connecticut 7 7 7 7 9 9 8 8 9 9 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 7
Florida 165 166 162 163 140 141 137 138 117 109 98 55 57
Georgia 115 114 100 60 60
Hawaii 3 4 4 3 3
Illinois 75 75 77 77 73 73 72 72 73 73 75 75 70 70 69 69 65 65
Iowa 70 70 64 64 54 54 53 53 52 52 53 53 54 54 54 54 38 38
Kansas 72 71 61 60 62 56 58 57 36
Kentucky 31 31 30 30
Maine 11 11 10 10 9 9
Maryland 40 40 42 42 39 39 39 39 35 35 32 32 23 23 13 13 12 12
Massachusetts 30 30 27 27 25 25 19 19 18 18 17 17 15 15 16 16 16 16
Michigan 30
Minnesota 37 37
Missouri 48 49 46 47 44 44 38 39 38 38 39 40 21 22
Nebraska 21
New Jersey 20 20 19 19 18 18 17 17 19 19 17 17 17 17 16 16 14 14
New York 60 60 62 62 59 59 58 58 56 56 52 52 46 46 49 49 43 43
North Carolina 36 36 34 34
Oregon 19 19 19 19 17 17 17 17 16 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19
Pennsylvania 57 57 53 53 51 51 50 50 52 52 47 47 43 43 42 42 42 42
Rhode Island 1 1
South Carolina 52 51 46 41 34 34 34 20 18
Tennessee 52 50 64 72 68 31 36
Texas 93 90
Utah 13 13 16 16 17 17 14 14 16 16
Vermont 4 4
Virginia 47 47 21 21 24 24
Washington 23 23 21 21 22 22 22 22 20 20 24 24 25 25 24 24 25 25
West Virginia 21 21 18 18
Wisconsin 85 85 92 92 80 80 76 76 71 71 67 67 66 66 66 66 35 35
Total Hospitals 786 913 779 904 775 938 752 906 616 1012 594 984 622 984 674 994 634 986
Total States 15 17 15 17 16 19 16 19 16 22 16 22 18 24 21 28 24 33
2001 1998 1999 2000 1997 1993 1994 1995 1996